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FACTS
1.

Defendant entered a guilty plea before the Honorable James Stow on November 21,
2011, to a violation of a first offense DUI.

2.

Defendant had requested a withheld judgment that the Court denied as the result of a
prior misdemeanor, non-alcohol related offense approximately four (4) years earlier
(Sentencing Hearing, April 5, 2012, p. 7).

3.

The discovery response received from the County prosecutor in this matter did not
disclose a prior offense, and defense counsel was not informed of the prior offense
until he made Defendant's request for a withheld judgment (Sentencing Hearing,
April 5, 2012, p.5).

4.

Defendant executed a notification of subsequent penalties form for a Defendant who
was under 21 years old; this Defendant is over 21 years old (Sentencing Hearing,
April 5, 2012, p.6).

5.

On November 8, 2012, the Honorable John Stegner upheld the Magistrate decision.
ISSUE

Should the Defendant have been allowed to withdraw his previously entered plea of
guilty to a misdemeanor offense when he executed the incorrect notification of subsequent
penalties and did not receive a withheld judgment?
APPLICABLE LAW

Rule 33. Sentence and judgment [Effective until July 1, 2012]
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(a) Sentence.
( 1) Time for judgment and sentence. After a plea or verdict of guilty, if the
judgment be not arrested nor a new trial granted, the court must appoint a time for
pronouncing judgment and sentence, which, in cases of felony, must, unless
waived by the defendant, be at least two (2) days after the verdict. Before
imposing sentence the court shall afford counsel an opportunity to speak on behalf
of the defendant and shall address the defendant personally to ask if the defendant
wishes to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of
punishment. Pending sentence the court may commit the defendant or continue or
alter the bail.
(2) Method of securing defendant's appearance at sentencing.
A. If a defendant is in custody the custodial officer shall present the defendant
before the court for sentencing.
B. If a defendant, who is at liberty on own recognizance or on bail pursuant to a
previous court order issued in the same criminal action, does not appear for
sentencing when defendant's personal attendance is necessary, the court, in
addition to the forfeiture of the undertaking of bail, or of money deposited may
issue a bench warrant for defendant's arrest. Upon taking the defendant into
custody pursuant to such bench warrant the executing peace officer must, without
unnecessary delay, cause defendant to be brought into court for sentencing.
(3) Notification of right to appeal. After imposing sentence the court shall advise
the defendant of the right to appeal and of the right of a person who is unable to
pay the costs of an appeal to apply for leave to appeal in forma pauperis.
(b) Judgment. The judgment of conviction shall set forth the plea, the verdict or
findings, and the adjudication and sentence. If the defendant is found not guilty or
for any other reason is entitled to be discharged, judgment shall be entered
accordingly. The judgment shall be signed by the judge and entered by the clerk.
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(c) Withdrawal of plea of guilty. A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty may be
made only before sentence is imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended; but
to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of
conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw defendant's plea.
Rule 10. \Vithheld judgments in the magistrates division - Conditions

Rules Text
(a) Conditions considered in granting withheld judgments. Before granting any
withheld judgment pursuant to section 19-2601, Idaho Code, in the magistrates
division, the court must consider:
( 1) All the facts and circumstances surrounding the offense with which the
defendant is charged; and,
(2) Whether the defendant is a first offender; and,
(3) The previous actions and character of the defendant; and,
(4) Whether the defendant might reasonably be expected to be rehabilitated; and,
(5) Whether it reasonably appears that the defendant will abide by the terms of the
probation; and,
(6) The interests of society in being protected from possible future criminal
conduct of the defendant; and,
(7) The impact a record of a criminal conviction would have upon the defendant's
future development and/or employment status.
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(b) Second and subsequent withheld judgments. No second or any subsequent
withheld judgment may be granted to the same defendant in the magistrates
division unless the court in its discretion finds there to exist extraordinary
circumstances, and the court in determining whether extraordinary circumstances
exist, shall consider, in addition to the foregoing, the following factors:
(1) Whether or not the defendant is before the court charged with the same or a
related offense for which the defendant has received a prior withheld judgment;
and,
(2) Whether or not the defendant has received a prior withheld judgment in any
court proceeding within five (5) years of the date on which the defendant appears
before the court for sentencing; and,
(3) Whether or not the defendant has ever been convicted of a felony offense.
(c) Extraordinary circumstances for withheld judgments. In making a
determination that extraordinary circumstances exist, so as to allow the entry of a
second or any subsequent withheld judgment for the same defendant in the
magistrates division, the judge making this determination and awarding a second
or subsequent withheld judgment shall make specific findings as to what factors
have been considered in reaching this decision.
State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295,787 P.2d 281 (Idaho 1990)

When a defendant enters a plea of guilty, the defendant waives, among others,
the following rights of constitutional dimension: the privilege against compulsory
self- incrimination, the right to a jury trial and the right to confront one's
accusers. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274
(1969). Fundamental rights are involved, and a valid waiver will not be
presumed but must be demonstrated by the record. Id. I.C.R. 11 (c) provides:
(c) Acceptance of plea of guilty. Before a plea of guilty is accepted, the
record of the entire proceedings, including reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom, must show:
( 1) The voluntariness of the plea.
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(2) The defendant was informed of the consequences of the plea, including
minimum and maximum punishments, and other direct consequences which may
apply.
(3) The defendant was advised that by pleading guilty he would waive his right
against compulsory self-incrimination, his right to trial by jury, and his
right to confront witnesses against him.
(4) The defendant was informed of the nature of the charge against him.
(5) Whether any promises have been made to the defendant, or whether the
plea is a result of any plea bargaining agreement, and if so, the nature of the
agreement and that the defendant was informed that the court is not bound by
any promises or recommendation from either party as to punishment. (Emphasis
added.)
Additionally, the court must determine whether any promises have been made to
the defendant, whether the plea resulted from a bargained agreement, the nature
of the agreement, and whether the defendant is aware the court is not bound by
any promises or recommendation regarding punishment. State v. Colyer, 98
Idaho 32, 36, 557 P.2d 626,
630 (1976).
Before a trial court accepts a plea of guilty in a felony case, the record must
[787 P.2d 284]
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show that the plea has been made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily,
and the validity of a plea is to be determined by considering all the relevant
circumstances surrounding the plea as contained in the record. State v. Co(yer,
98 Idaho 32, 557 P.2d 626 (1976). As provided in Colyer, whether a plea is
voluntary and understood by the defendant requires inquiry into three basic
areas. The first is whether the defendant's plea was voluntary in the sense that
he understood the nature of the charges and was not coerced. Secondly, it
must be determined whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived
his rights to a jury trial, to confront his accusers, and to refrain from
incriminating himself Thirdly, it must be determined whether the defendant
understood the consequences of pleading guilty. 98 Idaho at 34, 557 P.2d at
628 (1976); see also State v. Howell, 104 Idaho 393,659 P.2d 147 (1983). In
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Colyer we stated "the voluntariness of a guilty plea can be determined by
considering all the relevant surrounding circumstances contained in the record."
(Emphasis added.) 98 Idaho at 34,
557 P.2d at 628; see also I.C.R. l l(c).
II.

A motion to withdraw a plea is governed by I.C.R. 33(c). 121 Generally, a
motion to withdraw a plea of guilty may be made only before sentence is
imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended. However, after sentencing, the
court may set aside a judgment of conviction and permit a defendant to
withdraw the plea to correct a manifest injustice. I.C.R. 33( c). A stricter
standard is applied to motions for plea withdrawal following sentencing to insure
that the accused does not plead guilty merely to test the weight of potential
punishment and then to withdraw the plea if the sentence is unexpectedly
severe. State v. Simons, 112 Idaho 254, 731 P.2d 797 (Ct.App.1987); State v.
Freeman, 110 Idaho 117, 714 P.2d 86 (Ct.App.1986). A motion to withdraw a
plea of guilty is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, State v.
Simons, 1 12 Idaho at 256, 731 P.2d at 799; State v. Freeman, 110 Idaho at
121, 714 P.2d at 90, and such discretion should be liberally exercised. State v.
Martinez, 89 Idaho 129, 138, 403 P.2d 597, 603 (1965); see also State v.
Creech, 109 Idaho 592, 594, 710 P.2d 502, 504 ( 1985), citing Kienlen v. United
States, 379 F.2d 20,24 (10th Cir.1967).
The standard for review on appeal in cases where a defendant has
attempted to withdraw a guilty plea is whether the district court abused its
discretion in denying the motion. State v. Ballard, 114 Idaho 799, 761 P.2d 1151
(1988). As noted in Ballard, l 14 Idaho at 801, fn.2, 761 P.2d 1153, fn. 2; LC.R.
33(c) is the same as Federal Rule 32(d), therefore federal case law is both
helpful and relevant to the resolution of these issues. Federal case law clearly
establishes that even presentence withdrawal of a guilty plea is not an automatic
right, United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208,221 (D.C.Cir.1975); Goo v. United
States, 187 F.2d 62 (9th Cir.1951 ), and that the defendant has the burden of
proving that the plea should be allowed to be withdrawn. Everett v. United
States, 336 F.2d 979,984 (D.C.Cir.1964). The standard of review in these
cases is an "abuse of discretion" standard, United States v. Rasmussen, 642
F.2d 165, 167 (5th Cir.1981 ), and prejudice to the state is not a necessary finding
for rejection of a motion to withdraw plea. United States v. Rasmussen, 642 F.2d
at 168. We look to the whole record to determine whether it is manifestly unjust
to preclude the defendant from withdrawing his plea. State v. Simons, 112 Idaho at
256,731 P.2d at 799.
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ARGUMENT

This Defendant was led to believe that he qualified for and would receive a withheld
judgment from both prosecution and defense counsel in plea discussions. The discovery
exchanged between the parties did not disclose a pnor non-alcohol related offense
approximately five (5) years earlier in Bonner County. At the time the Court discussed the
issue of a withheld judgment, the prosecutor advised defense counsel of the prior misdemeanor
offense.
Defense counsel had not prepared the Defendant for this possibility and admittedly the
Defendant was not adequately advised of the effect of a prior offense when requesting a
withheld judgment.
Additionally, defense counsel mistakenly provided Defendant with a notification of
subsequent offenses form that was prepared for Defendants under 21 years of age. The error was
never corrected as it was not detected until after sentencing.
Idaho Criminal Rule 33 controls the withdrawal of a guilty plea. This Rule provides that:
(c) Withdrawal of plea of guilty. A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty may
be made only before sentence is imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended;
but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the
judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw defendant's plea.
In this case there were several procedural irregularities that should warrant reversal
of this Judgment. The first problem arose with the notification of subsequent penalties that
was inappropriately presented and because of the use of an incorrect form resulted in erroneous
notifications.
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The next irregularity dealt with the anticipated qualification for a withheld judgment that
was not granted because of a prior non-alcohol related offense approximately four (4) years
earlier. Idaho Misdemeanor Criminal Rule 10 controls the application of a withheld judgment:
1) All the facts and circumstances surrounding the offense with which the
defendant is charged; and,
(2) Whether the defendant is a first offender; and,
(3) The previous actions and character of the defendant; and,
(4) Whether the defendant might reasonably be expected to be
rehabilitated; and,
(5) Whether it reasonably appears that the defendant will abide by the terms of
the probation; and,
(6) The interests of society in being protected from possible future criminal
conduct of the defendant; and,
(7) The impact a record of a criminal conviction would have upon the defendant's
future development and/or employment status.

CONCLUSION

The Defendant was not adequately advised of the effect of a prior offense when
requesting a withheld judgment nor was he adequately advised of subsequent penalties, having
executed the incorrect form of subsequent penalties of a Defendant under the age of 21 years old.
The Court should reverse this Judgment and remand this matter for trial.
DATED this

~ of March, 2013.
R. D. WATSON, Attorneyfo} Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the ~ y of }.;\C,f{Q\(1 , 2013, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

@u.s.

MAIL
KENNETH D. BROOKS
Kootenai County Prosecutor's OfficeO HAND DELIVERED
P.O. Box 9000
0 FACSIMILE
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000
FAX: 208.446.1833
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